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Macedonia	name	dispute:	Problem	solved?
An	agreement	has	been	reached	in	the	long-running	name	dispute	between	Greece	and	Macedonia.
Thimios	Tzallas	writes	that	although	the	agreement	is	still	subject	to	approval	by	the	parliaments	of
both	countries,	Macedonian	Prime	Minister	Zoran	Zaev	has	sent	a	strong	message	to	Brussels	in
advancing	the	country’s	case	for	EU	membership.
The	long-running	disagreement	over	what	to	call	‘the	former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia’
(FYROM)	has	been	an	entirely	insignificant	one.	The	country	has	co-existed	harmoniously	with	its	neighbour	Greece
for	a	quarter	of	a	century,	and	no	territorial	or	national	minority	conflict	has	clouded	their	relations.	The	issue	of	what
to	call	the	country	has	also	been	resolved	in	practice:	the	whole	world	refers	to	it	as	‘Macedonia’	and	will	continue	to
do	so	regardless	of	the	new	name	(Republic	of	North	Macedonia)	contained	in	the	new	agreement.
But	despite	this,	in	2017,	just	twelve	days	after	being	sworn	in,	Nikola	Dimitrov,	FYROM’s	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs,
went	to	Greece	and	in	a	TV	interview	told	the	Greek	public	that	the	disagreement	about	the	name	is	“his	country’s
greatest	problem”.	It	is	not.	In	2015,	fourteen	armed	men	and	eight	policemen	were	killed	at	Kumanovo,	near
FYROM’s	border	with	Kosovo.	The	incident	shook	public	opinion	in	the	country,	re-igniting	memories	of	2001,	when	it
stood	at	the	brink	of	civil	war	on	the	issue	of	the	rights	of	the	Albanian	minority.
In	2017,	Zoran	Zaev,	then	leader	of	the	opposition	and	currently	Prime	Minister,	was	physically	attacked	in
Parliament	because	he	dared	voice	his	consent	to	the	election	of	an	Albanian	MP	as	Speaker.	Political	tensions	are
currently	at	a	high	point:	the	previous	government	put	20,000	citizens	under	surveillance	in	its	efforts	to	exert	control
over	judicial	authorities,	the	state	administration	and	its	political	opponents.	Officials	who	investigated	cases	of
corruption	in	the	public	sector	had	to	enter	special	protection	programmes	because	their	lives	were	in	danger.	These
are	the	country’s	real	problems,	not	the	way	in	which	the	name	of	the	country	will	be	written	in	the	EU’s	future
publications,	an	issue	in	which	only	Greece	is	interested.
Why	then	did	Dimitrov	consider	these	issues	less	important	than	a	disagreement	of	a	merely	symbolic	nature?	The
answer	lies	in	a	recent	statement	by	Johannes	Hahn.	The	Austrian	commissioner,	responsible	for	EU	enlargement	in
the	Western	Balkans,	likened	the	process	of	accession	of	the	candidate	Balkan	states	to	a	sailing	race.	The	six
countries	are	at	different	stages	of	the	course,	and,	depending	on	their	performance	in	establishing	rule	of	law	and
resolving	national	disputes,	they	will	improve	or	worsen	their	ranking.
The	European	Union	does	not	want	to	end	up	with	countries	which	upon	reaching	their	destination	will	create
difficulties	for	those	who	are	still	battling	the	waves.	For	example,	Brussels	does	not	want	Serbia	(now	negotiating	its
accession)	blocking	discussions	with	Kosovo,	which	as	yet	has	not	even	been	recognised	as	a	candidate	country.
The	Serbs	have	themselves	been	the	victims	of	such	practices,	when	Croatia	blocked	their	negotiations	with	the	EU
by	invoking	the	rights	of	the	Croatian	minority	in	Serbia.	Greece	is	presently	doing	exactly	the	same	thing	in
obstructing	FYROM’s	accession	not	only	to	the	EU,	but	also	to	NATO.
In	2015	in	Vienna,	the	six	candidate	countries	made	a	commitment	to	avoid	obstructing	the	accession	course	of	their
neighbours.	No	undertaking	in	principle	operates	as	effectively	as	bilateral	treaties	that	resolve	problems	directly
instead	of	suppressing	them	temporarily,	only	for	the	countries	involved	to	encounter	them	again	later	on.	In	the
Balkans,	it	is	not	only	national	disagreements	that	are	suppressed,	but	also	the	treaties	that	are	meant	to	regulate
them.	Some	are	never	ratified	by	national	parliaments,	fearing	the	recurrence	of	events	like	those	that	happened
recently	in	Montenegro	upon	its	efforts	to	resolve	a	border	dispute	with	Kosovo.	The	ratification	of	a	similar	treaty
between	Bosnia	and	Croatia	is	pending	since	1999.
The	new	agreement	on	the	naming	dispute	is	under	a	very	similar	threat.	It	will	now	have	to	be	sent	to	both
parliaments	for	ratification.	Hours	after	the	two	neighbours	declared	they	had	reached	their	historic	settlement,	the
Greek	opposition	called	a	no-confidence	vote	over	the	agreement,	whilst	Macedonian	President	Gjorge	Ivanov
walked	out	of	a	meeting	with	Zaev	declaring	that	he	will	not	sign	“its	disastrous	text”.	The	new	deal	might	just	be
another	case	where	“Balkan	states	are	satisfied	with	a	less	formalised	solution	where	the	agreement	falls	short	of
ratification	but	is	still	implemented”.
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Either	way,	Prime	Minister	Zaev	has	managed	to	send	a	strong	message	to	Brussels.	He	is	making	gestures	of
goodwill	towards	Greece,	such	as	removing	statues	of	Alexander	the	Great,	whom	his	predecessor,	the	nationalist
politician	Nikola	Gruevski,	re-invented	as	the	forefather	of	the	country.	Zaev	has	also	allied	himself	with	the	Albanian
MPs,	recognising	the	need	for	peaceful	co-existence	between	the	two	communities	and	inciting	the	wrath	of	Russia,
which	accuses	the	EU	“of	imposing	a	pro-Albanian	government	at	Skopje”.	The	economy	is	now	showing	signs	of
recovery,	with	foreign	investment	more	than	doubling	in	the	first	four	months	of	2018.
Under	Zaev’s	leadership,	the	country	is	meeting	all	the	requirements	demanded	by	Brussels:	forging	a	spectacular,
rather	than	secretive,	resolution	to	the	bilateral	crisis,	reigning-in	rampant	nationalism,	limiting	Russian	influence,	and
establishing	a	competitive	economy.	If	Zaev	is	still	adrift	at	sea,	then	the	Greeks	are	helping	him	make	sail	and	reach
EU	membership,	the	same	harbour	that	they	themselves	reached	back	in	the	1980s.	At	that	time	Greece	had	only
just	transitioned	to	democracy	and	had	seen	a	military	invasion	of	Cyprus	by	Turkey.	If	the	Greeks	had	come	across
a	Balkan	nation	negatively	disposed	to	their	accession,	they	might	still	be	adrift.	A	reminder	to	everyone	that	the
historic	patterns	of	Balkan	states,	despite	their	differences,	remain	similar.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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